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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEON G. PRITCHETT, Administra-
tor of the Estate of Mary II. Pritchett, 
Deceased . . 
' Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUAL-
TY INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10558 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the administrator of 
the estate of Mary H. Pritchett for benefits due under 
a medical-surgical insurance policy and a family group 
hospital expense policy issued by defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff was awarded a judgment against defen-
dant for the sum of $3,513.00, plus costs. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The two insurance policies in question were issued 
to Mary H. Pritchett on November 28, 1962, at Phoe-
nix, Arizona. (See Exhibits 3 and 4.) The applications 
for the policies were prepared by defendant's agent, 
N eH Bailey, at the home of the Pritchetts in Phoenix, 
Arizona, shortly before the issuance of the policies. Pres-
ent at this transaction were Mary H. Pritchett, her 
husband, Leon G. Pritchett, and N e11 M. Bailey. (R. 
62-64) The policies were issued and placed on a checko-
matic plan so that every month defendant would deposit 
a draft on the Pritchett bank account for payment of 
the monthly premium. (R. 66) The first check was 
given to Mrs. Bailey at the time that the applications 
were fi11ed out and signed. (R. 67) 
Thereafter, on May 20, 1963, Mary Pritchett was 
admitted to the South Side District Hospital for an 
exploratory operation. She was discharged from said 
hospital on June 9, 1963, and thereafter entered the 
L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, and was in said 
hospital a total of 98 days between the time of entry 
and her death, which occurred January 12, 1964. (R. 61, 
Exhibits 1, 6) When Mary Pritchett was admitted to 
the L.D.S. Hospital in June of 1963, fo11owing the 
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hospitalization in Phoenix, she was diagnosed as having 
cancer, described as a "generalized metastatic carci-
Homatosis" from which she eventually died. The primary 
lesion was never found. (R. 132) 
The application blank attached to the medical-sur-
gical policy contained the following question: 
"9. Have you, or any member of your Family 
Group to be insured, received medical or surgical 
advice or treatment within the past three years?" 
The answer was given as: 
"Yes, as listed." 
Beneath this question there was a small space for 
an answer, and the following was given: 
"2-28-62," under the heading of Nature of Ill-
ness or Accident, "Food poisoning, completely 
O.K." 
And under Doctor: 
"McKeown, Phnx, Ariz." 
The application blank for the Family Group Hos-
pital Expense policy contained a question, 8B, which 
asked: 
"Have you or any dependent member of your 
family ever been treated for, or to the best of your 
knowledge and belief ever had any of the follow-. ,, 
mg: 
followed by a lengthy list of diseases and disorders 
of rnrious parts of the body, followed by the words: 
3 
"If so, give full details." 
In the small blank furnished for the details, the 
date was given as "2-28-62," under Nature of Illness , 
Operation, or Accident, 
"Food Poisoning, ate tainted meat at restau· 
rant, completely recovered." 
Under Doctor: 
''McKeown.'' 
Address of Doctor: 
"926 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Ari-
zona." 
9 ( b) asked if recovery was complete with no re-
maining complications, to which the answer "Yes" was 
given. 
Defendant claimed in its defense that the foregoing 
answers to these questions on the application blanks 
were falsely and fraudulently made by the applicant, 
and that therefore defendant has a complete defense as 
to said policies. 
Doctor Vernon L. Stevenson, a local surgeon, testi-
fied as to the prior medical history of Mary Pritchett. 
He stated that on November 24, 1961, he operated on 
Mary Pritchett for a punctured duodenal ulcer, per· 
forming a surgical procedure known as "gastrojejun· 
ostomy." This operation involved circumventing the 
ulcer area by bringing the loop of the small bowel up 
4 
and attaching it to the stomach and performing a new 
opening from the stomach into the small intestine, by-
passing the ulcer. He stated that Mrs. Pritchett made 
a complete recovery from this operation. (R. 126, 127) 
The doctor estimates that recovery was made in this 
case after approximately three months. The doctor 
next testified that in 1956 he operated on Mrs. Pritchett 
for the removal of her gall bladder, and that at that time 
he corrected some old adhesions from the prior stomach 
operation. He testified that she made a complete re-
covery from the gall bladder operation. He stated that 
from that time until February of 1962 Mrs. Pritchett 
was well and had no medical problems, when she devel-
oped a gastro-enteritis from a food poisoning episode. 
(R.127, 128) Dr. Stevenson testified that he performed 
a surgical procedure which relieved the gastro-enteritis 
caused by the food poisoning incident and that she made 
an excellent recovery. He testified that she was in the 
hospital no more than eight days and was discharged 
without any symptoms. This operation was performed 
on May 27, 1962. (R. 130, 131) He testified that there-
after he communicated with her by telephone and that 
she made a good recovery. At the time of this surgical 
operation the doctor testified that he also performed an 
exploratory operation, and as of that time made a deter-
mination that there was no cancer present. (R. 131) 
Concerning Mrs. Pritchett's physical condition, follow-
ing the surgery of May, 1962, the doctor testified as 
follows: ( R. 133, 134) 
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"Q If you had been asked to give an opinion 
as to Mrs. Pritchett's physical condition follow. 
ing the time when she was hospitalized for this 
surgery, stomach surgery in 1962, following her 
release from the hospital and based on reporb 
to you, what would your opinion have been? 
"A Her condition was very good at that time. 
"Q So far as you were concerned was she in 
excellent health? 
"A That is right. The subsequent history is 
one of the things or the prejudices that we see all 
over A~erica so far as cancer is concerned. 
"Q Is there any way you have of accounting 
for how this cancer happened? 
"A I wish I knew the answer to that. 
"Q Other than the normal incidents of age, 
taking Mrs. Pritchett as she was following this 
stomach surgery, other than the ordinary inci· 
dents of age, would you think that she was a good 
risk as far as medical insurance was concerned! 
"A I would say she was. 
"Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not she was a good risk as far as health insurance 
is concerned? 
"A Yes, for her age group." 
Mr. Pritchett testified that at the time the appli-
cations for the insurance policies were made out that 
he and l\frs. Pritchett told Nell Bailey about all of 
Mrs. Pritchett's prior medical history, including the 
surgery following the food poisoning incident. He fur-
6 
ther stated that they even informed Mrs. Bailey about 
the trip by airplane to Salt Lake for the operation and 
that they furnished her with the names of the doctors 
in Salt Lake and Phoenix, to which Mrs. Bailey an-
swered: 
"That will be sufficient." (R. 73, 74) 
Nell Bailey testified by way of deposition that she 
recalled the incident when the application blanks were 
filled out by her for Mrs. Pritchett. She stated that Mrs. 
Pritchett had told her about prior operations which she 
felt were too remote to be of interest to the insurance 
company, and that she informed her of a food poisoning 
incident. Mrs. Bailey was questioned concerning an affi-
davit which she had signed on December 10, 1963, read-
ing in part as follows: (Ex. 3 to Deposition) 
"*** that during the time of my making of the 
application, as I said, Mary Pritchett told me 
that she had had operations more than three years 
previous thereto; that I made no reference to said 
operations on the application because they oc-
curred over three years prior to the date of the 
application with one exception, which involved 
an operation performed on Mary Pritchett on 
or about May 27, 1962; that I was fully informed 
of the circumstances of this operation, but made 
no reference to the same, specifically, because I 
was also informed that it related to a food poison-
ing which the said application had already stated 
she had been treated for elsewhere in the applica-
tion and from which she had fully recovered at 
the time of the execution of said application." 
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Mrs. Bailey was questioned about the above lan-
guage after said language was repeated, as follows: 
(R. 98) 
"Now, my question is: Is what you said in that 
affidavit that I have just now read - is what you 
said in that affidavit that I just now read, correct 
in all respects? 
"A If it pertains to this paragraph where 1 
have this medical information, yes. 
"Q Well, does it? 
"A Yes, it applies to this period. This is the · 
food poisoning period. 
"Q You are now pointing to, under para· 
graph 9-a, where it says: '2-28-62, food poisoning, 
ate tainted meat at restaurant, completely re· 
covered.' Then next to that the doctor is listed 
as McKeown, and his address, as you have already 
stated? 
"A That's right." 
Mrs. Bailey further testified as to the procedure 
the company goes through when it receives these appli· , 
cations. 
"Q When the company gets it, the claims 
department, they usually investigate any medical 
history that you put on a patient within the last 
three years; that they investigate. From your 
experience as a saleslady for this company, was 
that their usual method of proceeding? 
"A Indeed. And if it needed a rider to be 
put on the policy, they always put a rider on it. 
The claims took it - the underwriters, I should 
8 
say, took it before they issued the policy, and they 
investigated, and if they needed a rider to be put 
on it, they issued a rider when you got the policy. 
"Q But there was no rider that was placed on 
these policies? 
"A No, no. 
"Q Now, who is it in the company that usually 
makes these investigations? 
"A She is the head of the underwriters. 
J\ir. Ross: Claire Dewey? 
"A Claire Dewey." 
Mrs. Bailey further testified as to her work for 
defendant company and as to the discretion given to her 
by the company and the confidence shown in her by 
the company: (R. 101) 
"Q Did you, while working for this company, 
customarily when taking these applications, not 
list any operations that were more than three 
years before? 
"It is according to the operation. For ten years 
I have been in the insurance business, and I have 
never been questioned about my underwriting. 
So I have managed offices and hired agents and 
trained them. A gall bladder operation, it was no 
malignancy, is immaterial fourteen years ago. 
An appendix operation, something that isn't -
a cancer operation, something that serious, even 
if it has been five years ago, you still - or how 
long ago - you list it. But something - if you 
had an ingrown toenail taken off or your tonsils 
taken out, usually companies aren't interested in 
that kind of information. 
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"Q Did the company give you a certain 
amount of discretion as an agent in what you 
put-
"A Yes. 
"Q - in and what not to put in these appli-
cations? 
"A Yes. I have never been questioned in ten 
years about my underwriting by the insurance 
department or any company." 
Mrs. Bailey further testified that she put her hus-
band's name on the policies to help him win a prize, 1 
which he did. (R. Ill, 112) 
Defendant offered into evidence a specimen of a 
rider which defendant's witness claimed would have 
been attached to the Pritchett policy if complete infor· 
mation had been known by the company. (See Exhibit 
12) The rider excepted the following: 
"I. Stomach ulcer, disease or operation involv-
ing the stomach, pylorous or duodenum, 
2. Intestinal obstruction or any digestive dis- ' 
ease or disturbance, adhesions, hernia, or 
3. Any disease or disorder of the biliary tract, 
and/or 
4. Any cardio-vascular disease." 
The court ruled in favor of plaintiff in a memoran· 
dum decision. (R. 9-11) In the court's Amended Fino· 
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court rulecl 
as follows, in part: ( R. 44-46) 
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"4. That the applicant's application for said 
insurance policy was prepared by the agent, Nell 
Bailey at the home of Leon G. Pritchett and 
_Mary H. Pritchett and duly signed by ::Mary H. 
Pritchett on November 28, 1962; that at the time 
and place Mary H. Pritchett was aware of the 
fact that she had failed to make a full disclosure 
of all the medical history concerning her past 
medical history in the application submitted to 
the company, but had so indicated to the agent, 
Nell Bailey, that such was so, and left the policy 
application in the form submitted in the hope 
of receiving coverage that would not have been 
granted had she insisted on a full medical history 
being covered; that Nell Bailey, the agent of 
the Defendant, in the course of her employment 
was also aware that a full disclosure had not been 
made and encouraged Mary H. Pritchett not to 
include any other information and nevertheless 
prepared and submitted the application for the 
insurance policy in question, Nell Bailey prepared 
and sent in the application for the insurance 
policy in question, the Defendant company en-
couraged incomplete disclosure of medical history 
by providing a form with grossly inadequate 
space provided for the information sought and 
with reasonable care either knew or should have 
known that it was highly probable that the form 
in question did not contain a full medical history 
but was willing to extend coverage on the appli-
cation with a desire to accept the premiums that 
it likley wouldn't have received had it insisted 
on full disclosure of medical history and the re-
sulting elaborate exclusion from coverage that 
would follow, but relied on the possibility of gain-
ing advantage by claiming policy defenses in case 
of illness. 
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"5. That had a full disclosure been made to 
Defendant company the company would have 
attached a rider which would have excluded bene-
fits resulting from disease of the alimentary 
canal; that Mary H. Pritchett died of a cancerous 
condition .which affected the alimentary canal, 
but no evidence was presented as to the origin 
of the cancer and therefore the court is unable 
to find that Mary H. Pritchett died of a disease 
of the alimentary canal, other than that her death 
was secondary to a general spread of cancer 
throughout the abdominal area; that had a rider 
been attached to the policy, excluding diseases 
of the alimentary canal, said rider would not have 
excluded medical expenses resulting from cancer 
of an undisclosed origin from which Mary H. 
Pritchett died." 
And the following Conclusions of Law, in part: 
"2. That Defendant has no available policy 
defense as to plaintiff's claims on the insurance 
policies in question, even though all parties have 
unclean hands, for the reason that the company 
has encouraged inadequate and incomplete re· 
porting of past conditions of health. 
"3. In any event, any omissions on the part of 
Mary H. Pritchett in regard to information con· 
cerning her past condition of health were imma· 
terial omissions in the case at bar for the reason 
that full knowledge would not have resulted in 
a rider excluding the claim in question. 
"4. The aforesaid Conclusions of Law accord 
with public policy considerations in check~ng 
medical insurance companies from encouragm~ 
insufficient and inadequate information on appl1• 
cation blanks." 
12 
ARGUlHEN'l' 
POINT I 
THE INSURANCE COlUPANY \VAIVED 
ANY POLICY DEFENSES IT .MAY HAVE 
HAD. 
There being competent evidence supporting the 
findings of the trial court, said findings cannot be dis-
turbed on appeal. See Searnons v. Andersen, et al., 
(1952) 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209; Buckley v. Co:r, 
122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277; Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070. 
Appellant in its brief has blithely accused IVIary 
Pritchett of fraud and mistakenly claims that the trial 
court found her guilty of fraud. This is not true. Had 
defendant read the case of Pace v. Parrish, (1952) 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, it would have found that there 
are nine elements which a party must prove before he 
l'an prove fraud. Since defendant alleged fraud, its bur-
den was to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. 
See Condas v. Adams, 15 Utah 2d 132, 388 P.2d 803. 
This, defendant failed to do, and the trial court did not 
so find. The balance of this brief will deal specifically 
with defendant's failures in this regard. 
A - DEFENDANT'S AGENT \VAS FUL-
LY INFOR.MED - HER KNO\VLEDGE IS 
IMPUTED TO THE COMP ANY. 
There can be no question but that knowledge ob-
lainecl by defendant's agent, Nell Bailey, in the course 
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of her employment as an insurance agent, is imputed 
to and becomes the knowledge of the defendant insur. 
ance company. Accordingly, defendant was charged 
with knowing what Nell Bailey knew. The general 
rule is stated at 29-A Am.J ur., INSURANCE, par. 
1019, at page 192: 
"The general rule of agency that the principal 
is charegable with, and is bound by, the knowl-
edge of or notice to his agent received while the 
agent is acting within the scope of his authority, 
and which is in reference to a matter over which 
his authority extends, is fully applicable to agents , 
of insurance companies. The general rule of in-
surance law is that the knowledge of, or notice 
to, an insurance agent as to a matter within the 
scope of his authority, and which is acquired 
while the agent is acting within the scope of his 
authority, is charegable to the insurer. The 
agent's knowledge is in law the knowledge of the 
insurer, although such knowledge is not in fact 
communicated to the insurer. · 
"By imputing the agent's knowledge of vio-
lation of policy conditions to the insurance com· 
pany, the latter has the knowledge necessary to 
relinquish a known right under the theory of ' 
waiver. This rule of imputation of knowledge is 
not based upon the theory of actual notice but 
rather on considerations of policy, namely, that 
where one seeks the advantages of doing business 
through general agents, fairness to the other 
party demands that the principal be in no better 
position than if he were transacting the business 
in person." 
This rule has been followed in Utah. See Bednarek 
v. Brotherhood of Arnerican Yeomen, 38 Utah 67, 157 
14 
P. 38,t; Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance 
CumJHlll!J of Portsrnouth, ct al., ( 1951) 120 Utah 109; 
23:2 P.2cl 754. Also the following authorities from other 
jurisdictions: 
Van Ross v. Metropolitan Insurance Cornpany, 
134' Kan. 479, 7 P.2d 41; 
Finkle v. lV cstcrn ~ Southern Life I rum ranee Co., 
171 Ohio 495, 172 N.E.2d 311; 
Pfiester v. Insurance Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 P. 245; 
F'arrners ~Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Baxley, 
202 Okl. 531, 215 P.2d 941; and 
Rocky Mountain Fire ~ Casualty Co. v. Rose, 
( 1963) 62 'V ash. 2d 896, 385 P .2d 45. 
A case somewhat similar to the case at bar is the 
ease of Farrners ~ Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Bax-
le!J, supra. In that case the applicant disclosed to the 
agent a history of female disorders and a prior operation 
for female trouble. The agent told her that this was a 
minor matter of no consequence and accordingly did not 
include her statement in the application, which he filled 
out and she signed. The court held that the policy was 
not voidable for fraud under the general rule as stated 
above. For a good statement of the general rule, see 
Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, 
Vol. 17. Par. 9401, at page 1, where it is stated as 
follows: 
"An insurer cannot avoid a policy by taking 
advantage of a misstatement in the application, 
15 
material to the risk, not due to the insured's bad 
faith. It is the duty of an agent for an insurance 
company to prepare the papers under his super-
vision so that they will accurately and truthfully 
state the result of the negotiations, and the agent~s 
failure to do so is, in legal effect, the fault of the 
company. Thus, the insurer's agent owes it a duty 
to correctly record the answers to questions co~. 
tained in the application." 
It is further stated in Appleman, Vol. I 7, par. 
940I, at p. II: 
"Even knowledge on the part of the insured , 
that the insurer's agent is acting adversely to the 
insurer, without participation in such action by 
the insured with fraudulent intent, does not pre· 
vent the agent's knowledge from being imputed 
to the insurer. Accordingly, under these rules, 
even if matters are misrepresented in an applica· 
tion, and the insured is at fault in some respect 
for such misstatements, if the agent had actual 
knowledge of the true situation concerning which 
the misrepresentation was made, or knew that 
such statements were false, the company cannot 
defend upon the basis of their falsity. And the 
contention of the insurer, which had refused pay· 
ment because of fraud in misstating facts in pro· 
curing the policy, that its knowledge of the falsity 
of a statement made, being only partial, would 
not relieve the taint of fraud, was considered un· 
meritorious.'' 
According to the record in this case, Mrs. Pritchett 
and her husband fully informed the agent, Nell Bailey, 
of her past medical history. The testimony of Nell 
Bailey corroborates the testimony of Leon G. Pritchett 
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on this matter. Leon Pritchett testified that Nell Bailey 
was fully informed, and that she made the decision as 
to how the application was filled out. Nell Bailey ad-
mitted that she was told of the prior operations, which 
she considered too remote to be of importance to the 
insurance company, and further she admitted that she 
was told of the food poisoning incident and its results, 
but that since the applicant stated that she had made a 
complete recovery, she did not go into detail. There was 
not one shred of evidence that Mrs. Pritchett withheld 
information or misstated any facts. 
The fact that Mrs. Pritchett was in good health 
for a woman of her age, was corroborated by the testi-
mony of Dr. Stevenson, who knows more about Mrs. 
Pritchett's condition at the time in question than any 
other person. Dr. Stevenson testified that Mary Pritch-
ett made a complete recovery from the surgery in May 
of 1962 and that her progress was fallowed by him 
thereafter by telephone conversations. He testified that 
as part of the same operation, he performed an explora-
tory procedure and found no cancer. He testified that 
following the operation, Mary Pritchett was a good 
risk for health insurance. This evidence shows beyond 
any doubt that at the time the application was made 
for this insurance, Mary Pritchett was in good health 
and indeed had made a complete recovery from the 
food poisoning incident of February, 1962. 
Such information having been furnished, Nell 
Railey had the absolute right to proceed as far as she 
17 
desired with this inquiry. Nell Bailey had sold insurance 
for approximately ten years and testified that she had 
never had any problems over any of her applicatiou1 
and that the company had faith in her as an insurance 
agent. Her knowledge was imputed to the company, 
and the company waived any defenses it could have ha<l 
for incomplete information on the application blank. 
B - THERE WAS NO INTENT TO DE-
FRAUD ON TIIE PART OF MARY PRITCH. 
ETT. 
It is clear that the law in Utah is that mere falsity 
of answers to questions propounded is insufficient, if 
not knowingly made with intent to deceive and defraud. 
See Wootten v. Combined Insurance Co. of America 
(1964) 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724; 
Chadwick~ v. Bene.ficial Life Insurance Co., 54 Utah 
443, 181 P. 448; 
New Y orl-c Life Insurance Co. 'V. Grow, 103 Utah 285, 
135 P.2d 120; 
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 10 Cir., 
97 F .2d 583, 108 F .2d 902; 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Willsey, 10 
Cir., 214 F.2d 729. 
Defendant failed to prove any such fraudulent in· 
tent on the part of Mary Pritchett. 
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1. THE AGENT USED HER DISCRE-
TION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AU-
THORITY GRANTED TO HER BY THE 
COMPANY IN FILLING OUT THE FORMS. 
Concerning the trust which the insurance company 
reposed in Nell Bailey, which was not disputed by the 
defendant, Nell Bailey testified at R. 101: 
"It is according to the operation. For ten years 
I have been in the insurance business, and I have 
never been questioned about my underwriting. 
So I have managed offices and hired agents and 
trained them. A gall bladder operation, it was 
no malignancy, is immaterial fourteen years ago. 
An appendix operation, something that isn't a 
cancer operation, something that serious, even if 
it has been five years ago, you still - or how long 
ago, you list it. But something - if you had an 
ingrown toenail taken off or your tonsils taken 
out, usually companies aren't interested in that 
kind of information. 
"Q · Did the company give you a certain 
amount of discretion as an agent in what you 
put-
"A Yes. 
"Q - in and what not to put in these appli-
cations? 
"A Yes. I have never been questioned in ten 
years about my underwriting by the insurance 
department of any company." 
Certainly a person with no knowledge out of the 
ordinary concerning the msurance business applying 
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for an insurance policy and doing business with an ex-
perienced agent, can rely on the agent knowing her 
business and knowing how to fill out answers to ques-
tions in the application form. Mary Pritchett and her 
husband could rely on Nell Bailey knowing what to put 
in and what not to put in. On this subject it is stated 
in Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, 
Vol. 17, par. 9402, at p. 13: 
"Accordingly, when the facts stated by an 
applicant to an authorized agent are disregarded 
by the latter as not material, the insurer is 
estopped to rely upon such facts to defeat a 
recovery. And where the facts are fully disclosed 
by the applicant, the failure of the agent to make 
the application contain such information or his 
omission of certain of such material facts there· 
from is chargeable to the insurer, and not to the 
insured. 
"Similarly, where an agent advises the insured 
what facts are material, an omission will not viti· 
ate the policy where the applicant has acted in 
good faith. *** And where an agent propounds 
a prescribed categorical list of questions and 
leaves out such answers as would work a refusal 
of the policy, and the insurer issues a policy, it, 
and not the insured, is responsible for the situ· 
ation so arising." 
It is stated at 29-A Am. J ur., INSURANCE, 
par. 1059, at p. 226: 
"In cases in which a soliciting or other auth_or· 
ized insurance agent, in the course of prepar~1g 
an application, suggests an answer to a questwn 
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therein or interprets its meaning and effect, the 
insurer is responsible for the insertion of the false 
answer, on the theory that the agent, in recording 
facts stated by the applicant when making out 
au application for a policy of insurance, acts as 
the agent of the company rather than of the 
insured, so that his acts, representations, and 
mistakes are those of the insurance company. 
Thus, where there are no circumstances to arouse 
the suspicions of an applicant who reveals a his-
tory of previous illness to the agent, and the agent 
advises the applicant that such illness is of no 
importance, the law does not require the applicant 
to go further and question the authority or judg-
ment of the agent to decide whether the informa-
tion is sufficiently important to merit consider-
ation in the application." 
Nell Bailey is the one who decided what was to 
be put in the application. She was the one entrusted 
by defendant to perform this function. Not only is the 
knowledge which she received imputed to the company, 
but the company is charged with any errors and omis-
sions made by Nell Bailey in the course of her employ-
ment and cannot charge Mary Pritchett with fraud 
when it was Nell Bailey who made the omissions of which 
defendant so vehemently complains. Natural justice 
as well as the settled law cries out at the injustice of 
defendant charging Mary Pritchett with fraud. 
2. THE COMPANY ENCOURAGED IN-
SUFFICIENT ANSWERS BY PROVIDING 
F'ORMS WITH INADEQUATE SPACE FOR 
THE INFORlVIATION SOUGHT. 
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The trial court was impressed with this argument 
and made a specific finding on it. In its Amended FinJ. 
ings the court held in part: ( R. 45) 
"The defendant company encouraged incom. 
plete disclosure of medical history by providi11 o 
a form with grossly inadequate space provideJ 
for the information sought and with reasonablt 
care either knew or should have known that it 
was highly probable that the form in question 
did not contain a full medical history but wa1 
willing to extend coverage on the application 
with a desire to accept the premiums that it likell 
wouldn't have received had it insisted on fuil 
disclosure of medical history and the resulting 
elaborate exclusion from coverage that would 
follow, but relied on the possibility of gaining 
advantage .PY claiming policy defenses in case 
of illness." 
It is submitted that the court is holding in thf 
aforesaid finding that defendant company did not in 
fact rely upon the information furnished in the appli· 
cation forms with inadequate space for complek 
answers, and further that the company has waived an) 
defenses it might otherwise have for omissions from 
said application blank. 
The court also stated, at a discussion following the 
presentation of the case, at R. 175: 
"THE COURT: The agent, yes. And I fur 
ther find that the way this was conducted, obr1: 
ously from these forms, that the company wei' 
knew that the agent was given full informat.wn 
But they didn't give you enough informat 1011 
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that it obvious - any person who gives you three 
lines and you are supposed to give them all of 
this information. 'Have you or any dependent 
members of your family ever been treated for or 
to the best of your know ledge and belief ever had 
any of the following: hernia, high blood pressure, 
epilepsy, syphilis, fainting spells, dizziness, rheu-
matism, sugar or albumen, tuberculosis, ***, 
throat or any other illnesses, operation or in-
jury? - State in full detail.' You can not tell 
what is wrong w~th an eight-year-old boy in three 
lines. I think the policy ought to be written for 
defenses.'' 
Accordingly, the trial court, based on the nature of 
the application forms. (Exhibit 3, 4) has specifically 
found that the company itself has encouraged inade-
quate and insufficient answers to the questions on its 
application forms. This amounts to a finding that 
defendant has waived any defense for insufficient 
answers and that it should be estopped from claiming 
any defense for the inadequacy that it has encouraged. 
3. AP P L I CAN T FURNISHED ADE-
QUATE INFORMATION TO MAKE IT EASY 
F'OR THE COMPANY TO MAKE FURTHER 
INQUIRY IF IT DESIRED - DEFENDANT 
IS CHARGED WITH THE INFORMATION 
A REASONABLE INQUIRY WOULD HAVE 
REVEALED. 
The application form furnished adequate informa-
tion to allow defendant company to easily make inquiry 
concerning the food poisoning incident and its sequelre. 
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The application blank contained the name of the doct01 
who treated Mrs. Pritchett, together with his addres1 
in Phoenix, Arizona. A phone call would have reveale1J 
any further information desired by defendant. Thi~. 
defendant chose not to do. This brings to mind a state. 
ment contained in the case of Wootten v. CombineJ 
Insurance Company of America, supra, at page 726: 
"The failure of respondent to volunteer the in· 
formation that her husband had resigned his jof. 
in July because with the added work his weal 
leg was being a~versely affected cannot reason· 
ably be considered as sufficient evidence upor 
which to base a finding of intent to defraua 1 
Appellant had sufficient knowledge of the phys1 
cal disability of respondent's husband to ascerta!r 
all the facts it needed as to its extent, if it baa 
deemed it important, by either asking further 1 
questions or conducting an investigation; ani 
it cannot blind itself from ascertaining the trull 1 
and then claim willful misrepresentation of fn, 
truth on which it relied in order to avoid payme11' 
under a policy. This would appear to be espe 
cially applicable in the instant case where tl1t 
1 
accidental death of respondent's husband was nn 
in any way related to his physical defect." (Italil· 
ours.) 
This court in the Wootten case held that the insur· 
ance company has certain duties which it must perform 
It cannot stand idly by and then claim def ens es fo: 
omissions which it could have easily avoided. This dub 
is clearly stated at 29-A Am. Jur., INSURANCf 
par. 1026, at page 199: 
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"The rule that whatever puts a person on in-
quiry, amounts, in law, to notice of such facts 
as an inquiry pursued with ordinary diligence 
and understanding would have disclosed is ap-
plicable, according to some authority, to charge 
an insurer with notice. This is in line with the 
general rule followed by the majority of the 
courts that have passed upon the question, that 
the principal is charged with the knowledge of 
that which his agent, by ordinary care, could have 
known, where the agent has received sufficient 
information to awaken inquiry." 
Not only did Nell Bailey have sufficient infor-
mation to awaken her to a duty of making further 
inquiry if she desired, but the company on the form 
l itself had adequate information to put it on a duty of 
1 inquiry to make further investigation. A simple tele-
phone call would have revealed any additional infor-
mation that the company desired concerning the food 
', poisoning incident and its sequalre. 
Nell Bailey clearly focused this duty in her testi-
mony at R. 96: 
"A No. She said they ran a thing down into 
her stomach. I don't know enough about opera-
tions to know the procedures of the doctor. But 
she said they had to run down into her stomach 
and pump this food out, and she almost died. 
And she didn't know what they called the oper-
ation, so I put the doctor's name down and his 
address where he may be contacted by the com-
pany." 
And again, R. 97: 
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"A Well, in our applications we usually pt; 
the doctor's name and his address so that the cur11 
pany can go into that. Their claims departme11 
usually goes into that. 
"Q Does the company usually investigate! 
"A Yes, indeed. 
"Q - there applications? 
"A Yes, indeed. If there is a medical histor 
like this, they usually go into it." · 
Appelman, Vol. 1, par. 220, p. 359, states: 
"On the other hand, an insurer cannot con: 
placently rely upon statements made by the u: 
sured where the type of information is of a char 
acter suggesting a cautionary investigation as I 
the accuracy of the statement given. And wher 
the insured discloses that he has undergone :1 
operation and furnishes the company with ti 
name of the attending physician, it has amp! 
information from which to investigate furtht 
and cannot complain that the insured failed I 
relate an illness ensuing upon such operatio1 
Furthermore, if the general nature of the di1 o 
order is stated, no more ample details need! 
given, in the absence of inquiry." 
POINT II 
THE CLAIMED FRAUDULENT cm 
CEALMENTS ARE IMMATERIAL. 
t !1 The Utah statutes require that a misrepresen• 
tion or concealment must pertain to a "material far: 
in order to give defendant a defense. Sec. 31-10-' 
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1, Ftah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended in 1963, states 
:11 as follows: 
'Ii 
If', 
IT 
u: 
ar 
I 
:r 
ti 
pi 
'lt 
"*** Misrepresentations, om1ss10ns, conceal-
ment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not 
prevent a recovery under the policy or contract 
unless: 
" (a) Fraudulent; or 
" ( b) lVIaterial either to the hazard assumed by 
the insurer; or 
" ( c) The insurer in good faith either would 
not have issued the policy or contract, or would 
not have issued, reinstated, or renewed it at the 
same premium rate, or would not have issued, 
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in as 
large an amount, or would not have provided 
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in 
the loss, if the true facts had been made known to 
the insurer as required either by the application 
for the policy or contract or otherwise." (Italics 
ours.) 
01 Section 31-19-8 as it existed prior to the enactment 
Iii of 1963, reads in part as follows : 
"The falsity of any such statement shall not 
bar the right to recovery under the contract un-
less it materially affected either the acceptance 
of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer." 
The court specifically found that the concealments 
complained of were not material to the risk assumed 
1L hy the insurance company and therefore could not afford 
r the basis for a defense. The court held in Finding of 
l·' Fat:t No. 5: (R. 45) 
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"That had a full disclosure been made to dt-
fendant company the company would have at-
tached a rider which would have excluded benetil\ 
resulting from disease of the alimentary canal: 
that :Mary H. Pritchett died of a canceruu1 
condition which affected the alimentary canal, but 
no evidence was presented as to the origin of thr 
cancer and therefore, the court is unable to find 
that .Mary H. Pritchett died of a disease of the 
alimentary canal, other than that her death wa1 
secondary to a general spread of cancer through-
out the abdominal area; that had a rider been 
attached to the policy, excluding diseases of thf 
alimentary canal, said rider would not have ex-
cluded medical expenses resulting from cancer 
of an undisclosed origin from which l\1ary H. 
Pritchett died." 
And in Conclusion of Law No. R: (R. 46) 
In any event, any omissions on the part 01 
:Mary H. Pritchett in regard to information con· 
cerning her past condition of health were im-
material omissions in the case at bar for th' 
reason that full knowledge would not have re· 
sulted in a rider excluding the claim in question 
The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion ni 
Law by the court were amply supported by the en 
deuce in the case. Instead of a situation where a corn· 
pany either accepts a risk or does not accept a rish 
the defendant in writing the type of insurance polic.1 
in question could accept the general risk and prott1 
itself as to specific conditions by attaching riders. I' 
this case the evidence showed that the defendant, en 
with full information, would have still issued the po\i, 
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hut would have attached a rider excluding diseases of 
the alimentary canal. The court specifically found that 
~Iary H. Pritchett did not die of any such disease but 
of cancer of an undisclosed origin. Accordingly, even 
bad the rider been attached to this policy, Mary H. 
Pritchett's claim would have still been payable. This 
situation falls squarely within the requirements of the 
Utah Statutes and general case law that concealment 
of a fact not material will not avoid a policy claim. The 
Wouttcn case, supra, is a good example of a claimed 
omission being immaterial. 
Another Utah case which held that a claimed mis-
representation was not material to the risk is the Farr-
ington case, supra. In that case the defendant asserted 
that the representation that the building was occupied 
as a skating rink was a fraudulent misrepresentation, 
whereas ,the true fact was that at the time of the appli-
uition for insurance, part of the building was dismantled 
and the building was vacant. The court stated in part 
as to the requirement that the misrepresentation be 
lllaterial at page 118: 
"There is no evidence in the record that the 
fact that the building was partly dismantled and 
vacant would increase the risk of fire loss. Al-
though generally a vacant building has a greater 
hazard of loss by fire, the fact that the electric 
power had been cut off and there was no danger 
from smoking by skating patrons might indicate 
to the contrary. From ought we know, it is as 
likely that there was lesser risk as it is that there 
was ·greater. At least there is no evidence from 
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which we can determine that even if there ha 1, 
been concealment or misrepresentation that r 
was material to the risk." 
In Appleman, INSURANCE LA\V & PRAl 
1 TICE, Vol. 1, par. 214, p. 325, it is stated: 
\I 
"Some courts have held that in order to pn d 
vent a recovery on the basis of misrepresentatio: ti 
as to present health or prior disease, it is necessar, 
to show that the misrepresentation was of~ 11 
material matter and induced the issuance of ti:· sl 
contract. Following that rule, it would be M n 
that the risk itself must be actually affected, an )' 
unless the matter concealed and misstated woul h 
have a tendency to increase the risk or to shorle' 
the life, the policy must not be avoided." lJ 
ti 
The evidence on which the trial court relied in ti 
case at bar specifically showed that the defendant woul 
have accepted the risk but would have merely attacht 'l 
a rider which would not have eliminated the claim~ n 
question. a 
h: 
The case of Hale v. Sovereign Camp WOW, 11 h: 
Tenn. 555, 226 S.W. 1045, involved a representatir 
IL 
that the applicant had not consulted a physician durin. ft 
the preceding five years. The court held that this 11~ 
insufficient to defeat the action on the benefit certificat 
(' though during such time he had summoned a dod 
during an attack of asthma from which he prompt 11 
recovered and though during such time he had procurr P1 
a prescription from a doctor to reduce his flesh at a tu: ·i 
when he was not sick, where the death was caused 
1 
·'' 
influenza, since such representations were as to rnattr '11 
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1, 11 Jiid1 in no way contributed either directly or indirectly 
r to his death. 
The case of Clegg v. John Ha,ncock Mutual Life 
' insurance Campany, Mo. App. 1940, 141 S.,V.2d 143, 
was au action on a life policy in which there was evi-
't dence that the insured had been treated for glandular 
J: trouble in 1936 and 1937 and that he died from cancer 
n iu 1!)38. \Vhen he applied for the insurance policy, he 
11
'. stated that he had not received treatment for diseases 
•le mentioned, including cancer, and had not within five 
n1 years been treated for any other disease. The court 
held that if the disease for which he was treated did 
er 
uot cause or contribute to his death, the misrepresenta-
tion was not material to the risk. 
11 In People's Mutual Life Association v. Cavender, 
e Tex., Civ. App. 1932, 46 S.W.2d 723, the insured rep-
u resented in an application that he had never undergone 
n. 
1'~ 
a surgical operation, notwithstanding the fact that he 
had a prior operation for sinus trouble from which he 
had entirely recovered. The court held that such a 
illisrepresentation was not material and denied the de-
fense submitted by defendant. 
Also see Poignee v. Monumental Life Insurance 
Co., Mo. App. 1945, 157 S.W.2d 531; Sovereign Camp 
WOTV v. Gibbs, 217 Ala. 108, 114 So. 915; Metro-
rr politan Life Ins1irance Co. v. Rowe, 69 Ga. App. 192, 
n ~4 S.E.2d 826; Wells v. Jefferson Standard Life In-
1 xuran1·e Co., 211 N.C. 427, 190 S.E. 744, (Statement 
r ill application for life policy that applicant had not 
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consulted a doctor for any cause not included in pr, 
vious answers held not a material representation sut. 
as to avoid policy, though about a month previou~; 
applicant had consulted a physician with reference 1 
half a degree of malarial fever of mild type wher, 
applicant's death was not traceable to malaria); P1l 
dential ln.Yurance Co. v. Seller.~, 54 Ind. App. 326, IO. 
N. E. 894, (Requires that treatment be for some au d 
ment which seriously affects the health of the insured. ii 
An Idaho case which is helpful is the case r. n 
Ru.Ysell v. New York Life Insurance Co., (1922) i· " 
Idaho 774, 209 P. 273. In that case the Supreme Cour II 
affirmed a judgment against an insurer on a policy o ti 
life insurance where it appeared that the insured ha 
stated in his application for such policy that he ha S 
never suffered any ailment of the stomach, that he ha L 
not consulted a physician for any other ailment ' s 
disease not included in answers to specific questiorr rn 
and that he had not consulted any physician or ph~ ti 
sicians within five years. The evidence showed that mo1 T 
than two years before the issuance of the policy, tl T 
insured had consulted a physician, who was a medic 
examiner for several insurers, complaining of indigt 
tion and overwork, that the patient acting upon t! 
advice of his physician took a rest of a month or ) 
but a year later the patient returned to the physici:' 
complaining of practically the same thing, and that ti 
physician then examined him very carefully and four 
that he had nothing more than gastric neurosis, wk 
was nothing serious and would not in any way shor' 
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, hi~ cxpedancy of life. The evidence further showed 
that the cause of death was an automobile accident. 
The court stated that even if the applicant had 
answered the questions truthfully, the practice of the 
f; medical examiners who have been to make an inquiry 
!! of the physician who had treated the applicant with 
~: special reference to whether there was a malignant 
ti disease or ulcers of the stomach or intestines; and that 
I. if the inquiry had been made of the physician, the 
r, medical examiners would have discovered nothing which 
3: would have materially affected the risk, so that the 
rr insurance contract would have been issued in spite of 
o the disclosure of such treatment. 
In dealing with the question of materiality, the 
.a Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Interstate 
13 Life & Accident Co. v. Potter, 17 Tenn. App. 381, 68 
1 S.W.2d 119, stated that a misrepresentation would be 
ri material if it would naturally and reasonably influence 
11 the insurer and induce it to decline the application. 
JI The court quoted the following language from another 
tl Tennessee case : 
't• "It is not to be left to the insurance company to 
say after a death has occurred that it would or 
would not have issued the policy had the answer 
been truly given. It is true the practice of an 
insurance company with respect to particular in-
formation may be looked to in determining whe-
ther it would naturally and reasonably influence 
the judgment of the insurer, but no sound prin-
ciple of law would permit a determination of this 
question merely upon the say-so of the company 
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after the death has occurred. The matter 1111, iii 
represented must be of that character which ti, hi 
court can say would reasonably affect the irr 
surer's judgment." th 
The court went on to hold a misrepresentation nr 
material where it appeared that in reply to the reque, a1i 
in the medical examination: "Name below all caust m 
for which you have consulted a physician in the pa' ha 
ten years," the insured noted one instance of influem 011 
lasting a short time and having no permanent effer co 
It appeared that in the same year in which insured hr., on 
had the attack of influenza, he had also consulted ti. 
same physician and then subsequently a second phys by 
cian, who diagnosed his trouble as a low-grade pyelit co 
or inflammation or infection in the kidney-pelvis, tr ca 
gether with systitis or inflammation or infection of tL rn 
prostate gland, such an infection apparently being di, ha 
to colon bacillus, which were not serious unless tllf w: 
developed into some other ailment; that the secon su 
physician treated him on nine different occasions a11 al: 
then gave a letter to insured's regular physician cot at 
cerning the ailment and treatment therefor; that ti th 
treatment consisted of injections of urotropine into P· 
vein for the purpose of washing out the kidneys a[ P: 
removing pus therefrom. The insured died about a ye:, su 
after the issuance of the policy from cancer of the liH of 
It appeared also that he had diabetes. The insured'' a 
active at his work during the period of treatment pn 
to the application for his policy, and his physician, wi pr 
saw him nearly e''ery day, as he went to and froill ! ,,
1 
work, considered the insured to be in good health :i' 
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111, iliil not include the consultations for the infection in 
ti, his report as medical examiner because he considered 
III them as minor troubles which had passed away. 
111 
In conformity with the spirit of the general law 
ue, and case law heretofore cited, the determination of 
list materiality cannot be left in the insurance company's 
hands to come to court and state whether or not an pa' 
:m. omission or misrepresentation is material. The trial 
'er court in this case has specifically found that the claimed 
I omission was as to an immaterial fact. 11.' 
ti. The only possible omission which could be claimed 
iys by defendant is the fact that the application does not 
H contain details as to the operation in May of 1962, 
caused by the food poisoning incident of February, 
tL 1962. If the company had had full information, it would 
dL hare merely ascertained that this stomach operation 
tllf was caused by the food poisoning incident and was 
~0 11 successfully handled by Dr. Stevenson. It would have 
all also found that Dr. Stevenson made a specific finding 
cot at that time, pursuant to exploratory procedures, that 
ti there was no cancer in the abdominal area of Mary H. 
to Pritchett. It would have also found that Mary H. 
a[ Pritchett made a full and complete recovery from this 
\·e:, surgical procedure and that at the time of the issuance 
iH of the policy, she was in good health and was indeed 
11 a good insurance risk. 
lfi' 
Defendant failed utterly to sustain its burden of I 
\\'I 
1 
! proring by clear and convincing evidence that the 
:i' ''lJeration of May, 1962, had any connection at all with 
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her death from cancer of an undisclosed origin. Ti~ 
court has so found, and the court's finding is support~: 
by the record. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court is supported o: 
competent evidence in the record. The evidence show! 
that defendant's agent, Nell Bailey, was fully inforrne( 
of Mary H. Pritchett's prior medical history. T · 
evidence shows that the company was given adequal 
information to make further inquiry if it had desir 
The evidence shows that the claimed omission was· 
material to the risk assumed by the company, and tha 
if the company had complete information, the most: 
would have done would have been to attach a rid 
which would not have excluded the claim in questio 
The evidence shows that complete information int 
hands of the insurance company would have shown thi 
Mary H. Pritchett was in good health at the timer 
the issuance of the policy, and that she had made a co 
plete recovery from the surgery of May, 1962. D 
fendant failed utterly to prove by clear and convinc' 
evidence that Mary H. Pritchett was guilty of frau· 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
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